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Article source: http://rss.cnn.com/~r/rss/edition_world/~3/6s_wlMwx5pY/index.html

(CNN) — At least 28 people died and 55 were wounded Saturday in clashes between protesters and members of a Libyan government-affiliated militia operating in the coastal city of Benghazi, the Libyan state news agency reported.

The violence began when protesters attacked the headquarters of the Libyan Shield brigade, demanding the militia turn over responsibility for its security operations to the military, LANA reported.

Benghazi’s ruling Local Council and the Libyan Interior Ministry issued separate statements calling for “self-restraint” and an immediate end to the bloodshed.

It’s been nearly two years since the overthrow of Libyan dictator Moammar Gadhafi, and the new government has reinforced its military by contracting with a number of militia groups.

Anger toward the militias, which are predominantly made up of former rebel fighters, has been building since Gadhafi’s overthrow.

It boiled over after some militias laid siege to government ministries in the capital city of Tripoli in April in an attempt to force the government to pass a law that would ban Gadhafi-era officials from holding office.

Libya’s government has acknowledged problems with trying to disarm arm and control a number of militias.

The Libyan Shield brigade has previously said it is operating in Benghazi with the approval of the Ministry of Defense.

Last year, protesters in Benghazi attacked a number of militia offices as part over the public anger that followed the attack on the U.S. Consulate that left the U.S. ambassador and three other Americans dead.

CNN’s Chelsea J. Carter contributed to this report.

Article source: http://edition.cnn.com/2013/06/08/world/meast/libya-benghazi-attack/index.html?eref=edition

(CNN) — At least 11 people were killed and 31 wounded Saturday in clashes between protesters and members of a Libyan government-affiliated militia operating in the coastal city of Benghazi, the Libyan state news agency reported.

The violence began when protesters attacked the headquarters of the Libyan Shield brigade, demanding the militia turn over responsibility for its security operations to the military, LANA, the news agency, reported.

It’s been nearly two years since the overthrow of Libyan dictator Moammar Gadhafi, and the new government has reinforced its military by contracting with a number of militia groups.

Article source: http://edition.cnn.com/2013/06/08/world/meast/libya-benghazi-attack/index.html?eref=edition

Biden on Susan Rice: She speaks for the president

Obama ultimately nominated former U.S. Sen. John Kerry for the post.

As national security adviser, Rice will play a key role in developing and guiding the administration’s foreign policy.

Unlike a Cabinet post, the appointment requires no Senate confirmation, allowing Obama to avoid a showdown with Republicans in giving a new job to one of his most public foreign policy voices during the 2008 presidential campaign.

Rice also has been a deputy secretary of state and was previously considered a possible candidate for the national security adviser job when Obama appointed Donilon.

Obama nominates three to bench, courts political fight

CNN’s Jim Acosta and Adam Aigner-Treworgy contributed to this report.

Article source: http://edition.cnn.com/2013/06/05/politics/rice-national-security/index.html?eref=edition

(CNN) — The battle continues over which court should try the son of deceased Libyan dictator Moammar Gadhafi.

In the latest sign of a growing divide, the International Criminal Court on Friday rejected Libya’s bid to try Saif al-Islam Gadhafi and asked the nation to hand him over.

Libya has consistently challenged the ICC’s demand to try Gadhafi, saying the Hague-based court does not have jurisdiction in the case.

Gadhafi, who has been held in the Libyan city of Zintan since his capture in 2011, faces charges of crimes against humanity linked to the uprising that ousted his father about two years ago.

The pre-trial chamber of the court questioned Libya’s ability to prosecute the younger Gadhafi, saying the nation’s judicial institutions are not well-established following the uprising.

“The Chamber found that multiple challenges remained and that Libya continued to face substantial difficulties in exercising its judicial powers fully across the entire territory,” the court said in a statement.

In addition to other challenges, the court said, securing legal representation for him in Libya will put the lawyers involved at risk and impede the proceedings.

Last year, lawyers said Gadhafi was in isolation except for visits from officials. He also suffers dental pain, and Libyan authorities have given him nothing to remedy that, according to the lawyers.

Libya and the ICC have been going back and forth since his capture, with the court saying the nation is obligated to surrender the suspect.

Saif Gadhafi, once his father’s heir apparent, was seized by militants in November 2011 as he tried to flee the nation.

A month before, his father was killed after rebel forces captured him near Sirte.

Article source: http://edition.cnn.com/2013/06/01/world/libya-gadhafi-ruling/index.html?eref=edition

Fast forward to 2008, when Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice traveled to Libya to meet with Gadhafi to offer American support.

In 2009, members of the U.S. Senate — Republicans Lindsey Graham and John McCain and an independent, Joe Lieberman — would travel to Libya to meet with Gadhafi to offer further aid. Sen. McCain said: “We discussed the possibility of moving ahead with the provision of nonlethal defense equipment to the government of Libya.” President Obama would eventually meet with Gadhafi to reconfirm the same relationship established during the Bush administration.

By 2011, President Obama was arming Libyan rebels and ordering airstrikes to overthrow Gadhafi. Some of the president’s most vocal supporters were the same Republicans who traveled to Libya two years before to help Libya’s strongman acquire military equipment. Sen. McCain said of the Libyan rebels: “I have met with these brave fighters, and they are not al Qaeda. … To the contrary: They are Libyan patriots who want to liberate their nation. We should help them do it.”

We did help them, something I opposed on the Senate floor as an unconstitutional overreach by the executive branch. We now have reason to believe that the Libyan rebels did contain elements of al Qaeda and other Islamic extremists.

Visit strengthens McCain’s resolve for U.S. intervention in Syria

Now we see the same enthusiasm for another U.S. intervention, this time in Syria. The Syria Transition Support Act approved last week by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, of which I am a member, has the potential to create more problems for the United States than it would solve. It is unclear what national security interests we have in the civil war in Syria. It is very clear that any attempt to aid the Syrian rebels would be complicated and dangerous, precisely because we don’t know who these people are.

The situation in Syria is certainly dire. At least 70,000 people have died, and al Qaeda is making confirmed inroads into the country. No one wants to see Syria become a bastion of extremism. But like other American interventions in the past, U.S. involvement could actually help the extremists.

There is also the quandary of nearly 2 million Christians who are uncertain of what to do. The Christian community in Syria has traditionally sided with, and been protected by, Bashar al-Assad’s regime. It is troubling to think that American arms may be given to Islamic fighters who may in turn be firing them at Christians.

This month, it was reported that the al Qaeda-linked Nusra Front in Syria executed 11 men who were part of al-Assad’s forces. Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad is no friend to the U.S. — but neither is al Qaeda. To aid members of al Qaeda in any way, directly or indirectly, is an insult to our brave men and women who’ve been fighting these terrorists since 9/11.

Perhaps the most dangerous aspect of this “transition support act” is that it would commit the United States to a leadership position in the restoration of Syria, and is very vague about what that looks like.

The language of “capacity building” contained in this act is an open-ended term that if logically followed, could eventually mean U.S. troops on the ground in Syria.

We “capacity built” in both Iraq and Afghanistan. Those who insist this language could never mean U.S. boots on the ground in Syria belong to the same Washington clique eager to support Hussein, Ghadafi and later, the Libyan rebels. Washington is not exempt from the law of unintended consequences.

Empowering Islamic extremists to achieve questionable short-term goals does not serve America’s long-term security or interests. Nor does it serve the interests of nearly 2 million Christians in Syria who fear they could suffer the same fate as Iraqi Christians who were abused and expelled from that country as radical Islamic forces gained influence and power.

These Christians are natural allies of the United States, and if we’re going to seriously discuss any American interests in Syria, the welfare of these Christians is more important than arming Islamic extremists.

History’s primary lesson is that we must learn from the past. Although there are some well-intentioned reasons for wanting to intervene in Syria, there are far more well-documented reasons not to.

Follow us on Twitter @CNNOpinion.

Join us on Facebook/CNNOpinion.

The opinions expressed in this commentary are solely those of Rand Paul.

Article source: http://edition.cnn.com/2013/05/29/opinion/rand-paul-syria/index.html?eref=edition

Fast forward to 2008, when Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice traveled to Libya to meet with Gadhafi to offer American support.

In 2009, members of the U.S. Senate — Republicans Lindsey Graham and John McCain and an independent, Joe Lieberman — would travel to Libya to meet with Gadhafi to offer further aid. Sen. McCain said: “We discussed the possibility of moving ahead with the provision of nonlethal defense equipment to the government of Libya.” President Obama would eventually meet with Gadhafi to reconfirm the same relationship established during the Bush administration.

By 2011, President Obama was arming Libyan rebels and ordering airstrikes to overthrow Gadhafi. Some of the president’s most vocal supporters were the same Republicans who traveled to Libya two years before to help Libya’s strongman acquire military equipment. Sen. McCain said of the Libyan rebels: “I have met with these brave fighters, and they are not al Qaeda. … To the contrary: They are Libyan patriots who want to liberate their nation. We should help them do it.”

We did help them, something I opposed on the Senate floor as an unconstitutional overreach by the executive branch. We now have reason to believe that the Libyan rebels did contain elements of al Qaeda and other Islamic extremists.

Visit strengthens McCain’s resolve for U.S. intervention in Syria

Now we see the same enthusiasm for another U.S. intervention, this time in Syria. The Syria Transition Support Act approved last week by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, of which I am a member, has the potential to create more problems for the United States than it would solve. It is unclear what national security interests we have in the civil war in Syria. It is very clear that any attempt to aid the Syrian rebels would be complicated and dangerous, precisely because we don’t know who these people are.

The situation in Syria is certainly dire. At least 70,000 people have died, and al Qaeda is making confirmed inroads into the country. No one wants to see Syria become a bastion of extremism. But like other American interventions in the past, U.S. involvement could actually help the extremists.

There is also the quandary of nearly 2 million Christians who are uncertain of what to do. The Christian community in Syria has traditionally sided with, and been protected by, Bashar al-Assad’s regime. It is troubling to think that American arms may be given to Islamic fighters who may in turn be firing them at Christians.

This month, it was reported that the al Qaeda-linked Nusra Front in Syria executed 11 men who were part of al-Assad’s forces. Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad is no friend to the U.S. — but neither is al Qaeda. To aid members of al Qaeda in any way, directly or indirectly, is an insult to our brave men and women who’ve been fighting these terrorists since 9/11.

Perhaps the most dangerous aspect of this “transition support act” is that it would commit the United States to a leadership position in the restoration of Syria, and is very vague about what that looks like.

The language of “capacity building” contained in this act is an open-ended term that if logically followed, could eventually mean U.S. troops on the ground in Syria.

We “capacity built” in both Iraq and Afghanistan. Those who insist this language could never mean U.S. boots on the ground in Syria belong to the same Washington clique eager to support Hussein, Ghadafi and later, the Libyan rebels. Washington is not exempt from the law of unintended consequences.

Empowering Islamic extremists to achieve questionable short-term goals does not serve America’s long-term security or interests. Nor does it serve the interests of nearly 2 million Christians in Syria who fear they could suffer the same fate as Iraqi Christians who were abused and expelled from that country as radical Islamic forces gained influence and power.

These Christians are natural allies of the United States, and if we’re going to seriously discuss any American interests in Syria, the welfare of these Christians is more important than arming Islamic extremists.

History’s primary lesson is that we must learn from the past. Although there are some well-intentioned reasons for wanting to intervene in Syria, there are far more well-documented reasons not to.

Follow us on Twitter @CNNOpinion.

Join us on Facebook/CNNOpinion.

The opinions expressed in this commentary are solely those of Rand Paul.

Article source: http://edition.cnn.com/2013/05/29/opinion/rand-paul-syria/index.html?eref=edition

Editor’s note: ‘Funmi Olonisakin is the founding director of the African Leadership Centre, and director of the Conflict, Security and Development Group, at King’s College London.

(CNN) — President Goodluck Jonathan’s response to the Boko Haram insurgency, including his recently declared state of emergency in three northern Nigerian states, is eerily reminiscent of previous approaches to sectarian violence in that region.

The Maitatsine uprising of 1980 is perhaps the single most important precedent-setting example. In December 1980, the confrontation between the Al-Masifu Islamic sect — which advocated purity in the practice of Islam — and the people of Kano came to a head. The Nigerian army and air force mounted a campaign against the sect. In the end, more than 4,000 people were dead with double this number injured alongside massive destruction of property.

Times have certainly changed. Nigeria’s population has doubled since the Maitatsine uprising. Nigeria continues to experience the “youth bulge” — a growing youth population — that was not planned for. The resulting pressure on socio-economic systems is evident in limited education and health and dwindling economic opportunities for young people.

Poor policies and bad planning have produced youth vulnerability and exclusion from mainstream life. This is doubly so in northern Nigeria, where class divides have further created a community of people with nothing to lose.

Read this: Nigerians ask, are we at war?

The global environment has also changed amid growing transnational threats. Al Qaeda continues to lurk in the neighborhood. Excluded groups in the region with affinity for Boko Haram are potential support networks amid an ever-rising flow of illicit weapons into the region.

One thing has hardly changed: elite behavior. Nigeria’s power elite remains far removed from the realities of life experienced by ordinary citizens.

It is no wonder Boko Haram has treated the offer of amnesty by the Jonathan-led government with disdain. For one, it may be worth holding out for a greater prize, knowing that it probably has this regime by the jugular. Besides, how could it trust that the offer of amnesty — which will unveil Boko Haram — is not a ploy by the regime to round them up and execute them? The allegedly extra-judicial killing of the sect’s late leader, Mohammed Yusuf, serves as a constant warning.

Watch this: Who are Boko Haram?

Perhaps more importantly, this military solution and current state of emergency is potentially damaging for the military. The Nigerian military only recently managed to repair its image, winning accolades abroad for its peacekeeping role. Asking it to employ maximum force in internal operations — causing casualties in the process among the very people it is meant to protect — has repercussions. Surely, this will diminish its stature abroad and reduce citizens’ confidence in the military at home, while drawing more support to Boko Haram and weakening troops’ morale.

That said, it is also the case that Nigerians far removed from the locus of the crisis may not see the military’s role in such negative terms.

This crisis will potentially deepen religious and regional cleavages. Perhaps the country’s saving grace is that for the time being, Nigeria’s youth population mostly buys into these divides. They do not yet have a common narrative about who their “real enemy” is. Barring a small number of states, where genuine effort is being made to confront serious governance deficits, the picture of elite marginalization and widening inequality is consistent countrywide.

A lasting solution to the crisis in northern Nigeria might lie in a missing trinity: a meaningful but powerful narrative to counter Boko Haram’s narrative; an action plan akin to a “Marshal Plan” for northern Nigeria; and isolation of what Jonathan has described as Boko Haram sympathizers in the government and security forces.

Developing a powerful counter narrative will demand a measure of sincerity and consistency among the country’s ruling elite. Such a narrative must stand up to the seeming lure of Boko Haram and have the ability to hold a young population captive for the foreseeable future.

An action plan akin to a Marshal Plan for northern Nigeria must be developed to suit the context. The federal government’s investment in regeneration of northern Nigeria, with a focus on youth sensitization, education and development of social and economic entrepreneurship, will be key. This might entail deliberate forms of youth cantonment, census-based planning, community-based programs, and innovative education schemes to kick start regeneration.

To be sure, an action plan for northern Nigeria will not be sustainable in an environment where youth exclusion is a countrywide problem even if it is more chronic in the north. Expressed intention to do this nationally in due course might persuade a captive youth audience.

The question remains as to whether alleged Boko Haram sympathizers among the elite can be dislodged from this process. This might be the single most important obstacle in a situation where retaining political power in 2015 seems more valuable to the regime than the welfare of a few million disposable citizens.

In the immediate term, we can expect the Nigerian military to record successes against the Boko Haram sect. But the victory will be hollow. Without the trinity of measures earlier described, Jonathan’s government risks sacrificing the ordinary people of northern Nigeria, the military’s reputation, and innocent bloodshed.

The opinions expressed in this commentary are solely those of ‘Funmi Olonisakin.

Article source: http://edition.cnn.com/2013/05/24/opinion/nigeria-boko-haram-funmi-olonisakin/index.html?eref=edition

Editor’s note: ‘Funmi Olonisakin is the founding director of the African Leadership Centre, and director of the Conflict, Security and Development Group, at King’s College London.

(CNN) — President Goodluck Jonathan’s response to the Boko Haram insurgency, including his recently declared state of emergency in three northern Nigerian states, is eerily reminiscent of previous approaches to sectarian violence in that region.

The Maitatsine uprising of 1980 is perhaps the single most important precedent-setting example. In December 1980, the confrontation between the Al-Masifu Islamic sect — which advocated purity in the practice of Islam — and the people of Kano came to a head. The Nigerian army and air force mounted a campaign against the sect. In the end, more than 4,000 people were dead with double this number injured alongside massive destruction of property.

Times have certainly changed. Nigeria’s population has doubled since the Maitatsine uprising. Nigeria continues to experience the “youth bulge” — a growing youth population — that was not planned for. The resulting pressure on socio-economic systems is evident in limited education and health and dwindling economic opportunities for young people.

Poor policies and bad planning have produced youth vulnerability and exclusion from mainstream life. This is doubly so in northern Nigeria, where class divides have further created a community of people with nothing to lose.

Read this: Nigerians ask, are we at war?

The global environment has also changed amid growing transnational threats. Al Qaeda continues to lurk in the neighborhood. Excluded groups in the region with affinity for Boko Haram are potential support networks amid an ever-rising flow of illicit weapons into the region.

One thing has hardly changed: elite behavior. Nigeria’s power elite remains far removed from the realities of life experienced by ordinary citizens.

It is no wonder Boko Haram has treated the offer of amnesty by the Jonathan-led government with disdain. For one, it may be worth holding out for a greater prize, knowing that it probably has this regime by the jugular. Besides, how could it trust that the offer of amnesty — which will unveil Boko Haram — is not a ploy by the regime to round them up and execute them? The allegedly extra-judicial killing of the sect’s late leader, Mohammed Yusuf, serves as a constant warning.

Watch this: Who are Boko Haram?

Perhaps more importantly, this military solution and current state of emergency is potentially damaging for the military. The Nigerian military only recently managed to repair its image, winning accolades abroad for its peacekeeping role. Asking it to employ maximum force in internal operations — causing casualties in the process among the very people it is meant to protect — has repercussions. Surely, this will diminish its stature abroad and reduce citizens’ confidence in the military at home, while drawing more support to Boko Haram and weakening troops’ morale.

That said, it is also the case that Nigerians far removed from the locus of the crisis may not see the military’s role in such negative terms.

This crisis will potentially deepen religious and regional cleavages. Perhaps the country’s saving grace is that for the time being, Nigeria’s youth population mostly buys into these divides. They do not yet have a common narrative about who their “real enemy” is. Barring a small number of states, where genuine effort is being made to confront serious governance deficits, the picture of elite marginalization and widening inequality is consistent countrywide.

A lasting solution to the crisis in northern Nigeria might lie in a missing trinity: a meaningful but powerful narrative to counter Boko Haram’s narrative; an action plan akin to a “Marshal Plan” for northern Nigeria; and isolation of what Jonathan has described as Boko Haram sympathizers in the government and security forces.

Developing a powerful counter narrative will demand a measure of sincerity and consistency among the country’s ruling elite. Such a narrative must stand up to the seeming lure of Boko Haram and have the ability to hold a young population captive for the foreseeable future.

An action plan akin to a Marshal Plan for northern Nigeria must be developed to suit the context. The federal government’s investment in regeneration of northern Nigeria, with a focus on youth sensitization, education and development of social and economic entrepreneurship, will be key. This might entail deliberate forms of youth cantonment, census-based planning, community-based programs, and innovative education schemes to kick start regeneration.

To be sure, an action plan for northern Nigeria will not be sustainable in an environment where youth exclusion is a countrywide problem even if it is more chronic in the north. Expressed intention to do this nationally in due course might persuade a captive youth audience.

The question remains as to whether alleged Boko Haram sympathizers among the elite can be dislodged from this process. This might be the single most important obstacle in a situation where retaining political power in 2015 seems more valuable to the regime than the welfare of a few million disposable citizens.

In the immediate term, we can expect the Nigerian military to record successes against the Boko Haram sect. But the victory will be hollow. Without the trinity of measures earlier described, Jonathan’s government risks sacrificing the ordinary people of northern Nigeria, the military’s reputation, and innocent bloodshed.

The opinions expressed in this commentary are solely those of ‘Funmi Olonisakin.

Article source: http://edition.cnn.com/2013/05/24/opinion/nigeria-boko-haram-funmi-olonisakin/index.html?eref=edition

Editor’s note: ‘Funmi Olonisakin is the founding director of the African Leadership Centre, and director of the Conflict, Security and Development Group, at King’s College London.

(CNN) — President Goodluck Jonathan’s response to the Boko Haram insurgency, including his recently declared state of emergency in three northern Nigerian states, is eerily reminiscent of previous approaches to sectarian violence in that region.

The Maitatsine uprising of 1980 is perhaps the single most important precedent-setting example. In December 1980, the confrontation between the Al-Masifu Islamic sect — which advocated purity in the practice of Islam — and the people of Kano came to a head. The Nigerian army and air force mounted a campaign against the sect. In the end, more than 4,000 people were dead with double this number injured alongside massive destruction of property.

Times have certainly changed. Nigeria’s population has doubled since the Maitatsine uprising. Nigeria continues to experience the “youth bulge” — a growing youth population — that was not planned for. The resulting pressure on socio-economic systems is evident in limited education and health and dwindling economic opportunities for young people.

Poor policies and bad planning have produced youth vulnerability and exclusion from mainstream life. This is doubly so in northern Nigeria, where class divides have further created a community of people with nothing to lose.

Read this: Nigerians ask, are we at war?

The global environment has also changed amid growing transnational threats. Al Qaeda continues to lurk in the neighborhood. Excluded groups in the region with affinity for Boko Haram are potential support networks amid an ever-rising flow of illicit weapons into the region.

One thing has hardly changed: elite behavior. Nigeria’s power elite remains far removed from the realities of life experienced by ordinary citizens.

It is no wonder Boko Haram has treated the offer of amnesty by the Jonathan-led government with disdain. For one, it may be worth holding out for a greater prize, knowing that it probably has this regime by the jugular. Besides, how could it trust that the offer of amnesty — which will unveil Boko Haram — is not a ploy by the regime to round them up and execute them? The allegedly extra-judicial killing of the sect’s late leader, Mohammed Yusuf, serves as a constant warning.

Watch this: Who are Boko Haram?

Perhaps more importantly, this military solution and current state of emergency is potentially damaging for the military. The Nigerian military only recently managed to repair its image, winning accolades abroad for its peacekeeping role. Asking it to employ maximum force in internal operations — causing casualties in the process among the very people it is meant to protect — has repercussions. Surely, this will diminish its stature abroad and reduce citizens’ confidence in the military at home, while drawing more support to Boko Haram and weakening troops’ morale.

That said, it is also the case that Nigerians far removed from the locus of the crisis may not see the military’s role in such negative terms.

This crisis will potentially deepen religious and regional cleavages. Perhaps the country’s saving grace is that for the time being, Nigeria’s youth population mostly buys into these divides. They do not yet have a common narrative about who their “real enemy” is. Barring a small number of states, where genuine effort is being made to confront serious governance deficits, the picture of elite marginalization and widening inequality is consistent countrywide.

A lasting solution to the crisis in northern Nigeria might lie in a missing trinity: a meaningful but powerful narrative to counter Boko Haram’s narrative; an action plan akin to a “Marshal Plan” for northern Nigeria; and isolation of what Jonathan has described as Boko Haram sympathizers in the government and security forces.

Developing a powerful counter narrative will demand a measure of sincerity and consistency among the country’s ruling elite. Such a narrative must stand up to the seeming lure of Boko Haram and have the ability to hold a young population captive for the foreseeable future.

An action plan akin to a Marshal Plan for northern Nigeria must be developed to suit the context. The federal government’s investment in regeneration of northern Nigeria, with a focus on youth sensitization, education and development of social and economic entrepreneurship, will be key. This might entail deliberate forms of youth cantonment, census-based planning, community-based programs, and innovative education schemes to kick start regeneration.

To be sure, an action plan for northern Nigeria will not be sustainable in an environment where youth exclusion is a countrywide problem even if it is more chronic in the north. Expressed intention to do this nationally in due course might persuade a captive youth audience.

The question remains as to whether alleged Boko Haram sympathizers among the elite can be dislodged from this process. This might be the single most important obstacle in a situation where retaining political power in 2015 seems more valuable to the regime than the welfare of a few million disposable citizens.

In the immediate term, we can expect the Nigerian military to record successes against the Boko Haram sect. But the victory will be hollow. Without the trinity of measures earlier described, Jonathan’s government risks sacrificing the ordinary people of northern Nigeria, the military’s reputation, and innocent bloodshed.

The opinions expressed in this commentary are solely those of ‘Funmi Olonisakin.

Article source: http://rss.cnn.com/~r/rss/edition_world/~3/vh8hcSk_mSQ/index.html